[Apparmor-general] apparmor vs chroot

Crispin Cowan crispin at novell.com
Tue Mar 6 23:13:50 MST 2007


Michael James wrote:
> AppArmor provides a more flexible, more secure alternative to chroot.
>
> Is this true to the extent that it should completely replace chroot?
>
> Does this mean we can safely ditch all the chroot cruft
>  surrounding daemons like dhcpd, named, postfix, etc?
>   
Replacing chroot with AppArmor profiles has the advantages of:

    * easier to do
    * more flexible
    * doesn't require extra storage for duplicate files, libraries, & such
    * more secure: chroot can be escaped

Chroot has the advantage of:

    * works on all Linux (and most UNIX) systems


> What's the philosophy of the profile writers, do we plan to do it?
>
> Are there sets of AppArmor profiles designed for un-chroot-ed daemons?
>   
You can combine them, and apply an AppArmor profile to a daemon that is
also chrooted.

There is no security advantage to this combo. It actually is marginally
*less* secure than an AppArmor profile around a non-chrooted daemon. We
plan to fix this security problem, but no sooner than 10.3.

However, it lets you preserve the cross-platform packaging for the software.

> I'm asking this question largely in a SuSE context,
>  hoping to reduce the named init script to something manageable.
>   
It is probably not worth the effort to un-chroot something that really
wants to be chrooted.

However, if you have a choice about chroot, and you know you are going
to put an AppArmor profile around it, then de-select chroot if possible.

Crispin

-- 
Crispin Cowan, Ph.D.                      http://crispincowan.com/~crispin/
Director of Software Engineering, Novell  http://novell.com
     Hacking is exploiting the gap between "intent" and "implementation"




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